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RULES GOVERNING STUDENT BEHAVIOR
enter the field of law rather than discouraged. No one should feel that
leftwing political leanings or associations might result in a denial of
admission to the bar. As Judge Motley pointed out in his opinion in
Law Students, "It is nothing short of a complete irony that lawyers who
fought for and won constituitonal protections for other professions are
the last to receive protection for themselves." 69 It is true that only a
very small percentage of all applicants are rejected by state bars on
grounds of character.Y However, the real problem to be confronted is
not the denial of admission occasioned by political probing of bar
examiners, but the "chilling effect" on freedom of speech and association.
Until required by the courts, all bar examiners should voluntarily share
the view of Robert E. Seifer, Secretary of the Missouri Board of Law
Examiners in 1952:
Speaking solely for myself, I so not think that inquiry into political
beliefs has any place in bar examination work. I think that the study
of law is the best training anyone can have for becoming a good Ameri-
can and I do not think it should be cluttered up with investigations
about political beliefs and whether or not the applicant happens to
agree with what a majority of the people may or may not consider at
the moment to be subversive. 71
J. MICHAEL BRowN
Colleges and Universities-Constitutional Law-Legality of
Broad Rules Governing Student Behavior
It is clear that the federal courts are concerned about the standards
of procedural fairness observed by colleges and universities at disciplinary
hearings.' But the courts have been extremely reluctant to scrutinize
substantive rules that govern student behavior and more reluctant still
to void such rules because of constitutional infirmity.2 Using Esteban v.
0"299 F. Supp. at 146 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 Estimates from New York, California, and Illinois bar admission rejections
in 1952 indicates that only one-half of one per cent of all applicants were rejected
on grounds of character. Brown and Fassett, supra note 3, at 497.
"'Id. at 508. Quoting a letter from Robert E. Seifer.
'E.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968);
Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Esteban v.
Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
'See e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Steiner v. New
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Central Missouri State University,' a recent case by the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, as a framework for analysis, this note will con-
sider the extent to which the courts can adequately protect students from
arbitrary action by school administrations if judicial review is limited
to procedural matters at the expense of substantive considerations. This
examination will be done, first, by measuring the college regulations in
Esteban against the constitutional standards of vagueness and over-
breadth and, second, by considering the Eighth Circuit's application of
the rules to the factual events of the case. Throughout the note, a com-
parison will be drawn between the court's handling of the students' acts
in Esteban and the judicial treatment generally accorded similar occur-
rences in a non-college context.
On the evenings of both March 29 and 30, 1969, demonstrations took
place on the campus of Central Missouri State College. During these inci-
dents, six hundred dollars of damage was done to college property, a public
highway was blocked, traffic was halted, and cars were rocked and their
occupants forced out into the street.' On the basis of acts committed
during these incidents, two students, Alfredo Esteban and Steve C. Ro-
bards, were suspended from school for two semesters after they were orally
advised of the charges against them and were given an informal con-
ference with the Dean of Men. Alleging a denial of due process, Esteban
and Robards sought an injunction against their dismissal in federal
district court. The district court directed the school to grant the plain-
tiffs a new hearing at which certain procedural rights were to be
accorded, including the right to notice of charges, the right to rudimentary
discovery, the right to presence of counsel, the right to confront adverse
witnesses, the right to call friendly witnesses, and the right to record the
proceedings.5
At the new hearing granted by the university, Esteban and Robards
York State Educ. Comm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Greene v. Howard Univ.,
271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967); Connelly v. University of Vt. and State Agri-
cultural College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965); Due v. Florida A.&M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
'415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969). The opinion of the court was written by
then Circuit Judge Blackmun, whose future decisions may be of considerably more
moment. On May 12, 1970, Judge Blacknun was unanimously confirmed by the
United States Senate to a seat on the United States Supreme Court. A strong
dissent was registered by Judge Lay both on the merits and on the procedural issue
of whether a federal court should merely review a disciplinary proceeding by a
state college rather than grant a trial de novo.
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1969).
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
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were given a full measure of procedural guarantees and were again sus-
pended for two semesters. These suspensions were upheld by the district
court0 and, subsequently, by the Eighth Circuit.'
THE REGULATIONS
The following regulations of the college were quoted by the Eighth
Circuit as pertinent to the suspension of Robards and Esteban:
All students are expected to conform to ordinary and accepted social
customs and to conduct themselves at all times and in all places in a
manner befitting a student of Central Missouri State College.
When a breach of. regulations involves a mixed group, ALL MEM-
BERS ARE HELD EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE.
Conduct unbefitting a student which reflects adversely upon him-
self or the institution will result in disciplinary action.
Mass Gatherings-Participation in mass gatherings which might
be considered as unruly or unlawful will subject a student to possible
immediate dismissal from the College. Only a few students intentionally
get involved in mob misconduct, but many so-called "spectators" get
drawn into a fracas and by their very presence contribute to the
dimensions of the problems. It should be understood that the College
considers no student to be immune from due process of law enforce-
ment when he is in violation as an individual or as a member of a
crowd.8
The principles of due process contained in the fourteenth amendment
require that before a state may fairly punish an individual, it must give
adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibitedY A statute that does
not properly describe illegal conduct is unconstitutionally vague.10 If
men of common intelligence must guess at the meaning of a statute or if
they could reasonably differ as to its application, it must fail for vague-
ness." When preferred freedoms such as speech, press, religion, and
assembly are involved, the standard is more demanding:
'Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
7 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
8 415 F.2d at 1079.
- Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). See generally Collings, Un-
constitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955); Scott,
Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 RoCKY MT. L. REV.
275 (1957); Note, Uncertainty In College Disciplinary Regilations, 29 OHio
ST. L.J. 1023 (1968).
"0Cramp v. Board of Public, Instructid i, .368 U.S.-278 (1961); Dickson v.
Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
" Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied
to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dis-
semination of ideas may be the loser.12
Do the regulations in Esteban exhibit sufficient specificity to avoid
the constitutional prohibition against vagueness? The first of the college
rules under which Esteban and Robards were disciplined prohibited any
mass gathering "which might be considered as unruly or unlawful." By
definition, an "illegal gathering" must amount to conduct punishable under
a properly explicit statute or state regulation; otherwise, the standard
pertaining to vagueness is not satisfied. Whether a crowd is "unruly" is
a question on which reasonable men could differ. Are spectators "un-
ruly" if, at a sporting event, they boo the referee? Are the participants in
a raucous fraternity party or an audience that hurls marshmellows at an
unpopular speaker "unruly"? These questions are difficult, and answers
are not likely to be uniform. The phrase "might be considered" in the
regulation would further reduce expected uniformity of opinion because
the inclusion of such language introduces additional elements of sub-
jectivity.
The second regulation in issue in Esteban required students to "con-
form to ordinary and accepted social customs and to conduct themselves
at all times and in all places in a manner befitting a student of Central
Missouri State College." Are the social customs to which the regulation
refers those accepted by the campus radicals, the "straight" students,
the average Missouri citizen, or the faculty wives' association? Is it
"befitting" a student to vociferously demand constitutional freedoms, or
is it "unbefitting" to refrain from such actions? There is surely a quantum
of vagueness and uncertainty in this regulation.
The court found no merit in the defendant's attack on the vagueness
of the regulations, said that the regulations were not hard to understand,
and expressed confidence that college students could find certainty in
them.' 3 The court further indicated that even if the rules were somewhat
broad, they were still valid because "flexibility and reasonable breadth"
14
in student regulations are not constitutionally fatal. The court joined in
the opinion of those "qualified and experienced" in the field of education
who have felt it preferable for codes of student behavior to be general
1 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
13415 F.2d at 1088.
"Id.
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rather than specific, and it cited as authority three articles-all written
by and for college administrators. 5 It is not particularly startling that
such individuals would prefer broad, general rules; for the writing of
new codes would probably be their task, and any code with specific
regulations would sharply curtail their discretion in matters of student
discipline. The court failed to note that others "qualified" in the field
of education 6 -such as the American Association of University Pro-
fessors, the National Student Association, and the American Associations
of Colleges-and some "experienced" in the field of law-such as Pro-
fessors Wright,' Linde,'8 and Van Alstyne 9-- have argued that spe-
cificity20 in student rules is preferred, if not required.
Ir rd.
11 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, AM. Ass'N. OF Uxiv.
PROFESSoRs BULL. (Summer 1968). The following organizations have approved
the Joint Statement: U.S. National Student Association, Association of American
Colleges, American Association of University Professors, National Association
of Student Personnel Administrators, National Association of Women Deans and
Counselors, American Association for Higher Education, Jesuit Education Associa-
tion, American College Personnel Association, Executive Committee, College and
University Department, National Catholic Education Association, Commission on
Student Personnel, American Association of Junior Colleges. It is interesting to
note that one authority on this point cited by the court (415 F.2d at 1088) is taken
from a publication of the American College Personnel Association, one'of the
groups that has adopted the Joint Statement.1
"Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rnv. 1027, 1064 (1969).18Linde, Campus Law: Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 40
(1966).
" Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DENVER L.J. 582, 592(1968).
20 Support for the proposition that student disciplinary rules should be specific
rather than general is found in the nature of a second act that the college, sustained
by the court, found sufficiently culpable to punish. This act was the writing of
a letter by Robards to a Missouri state legislator that contained the following
language:
I assure you, I do not stand alone in my disgust with this institution. From
suppression of speech and expression to ridiculous, trivial regulations this
college has done more to discourage democratic belief than any of the world's
tyrants. ... My comrades and I plan on turning this school into a Berkeley
if something isn't done.
415 F.2d at 1081.
In this letter the court could find no expression of a grievance (id. at 1084)
although the language in the second sentence about suppression of speech and
trivial regulations certainly has a grievance-like ring. The court also found a flat
threat contained in the seemingly-ambiguous third sentence (id.). Even assuming
that the court was correct in asserting that correspondence to a state legislator is
punishable if it either contains a veiled threat or does not with sufficient specificity
articulate a grievance, the court by its approach dealt in reality with whether these
acts could be punished at all rather than with whether they could be punished
under the regulations involved in the case. A student would have to be almost
1970]
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In addition to cases dealing with "vagueness" in governmental laws
and rules, a second line of precedent involves the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions.21 The courts have made it abundantly clear that the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech,22 assembly,23 and press 24
operate with full vigor on college campuses. While a state is not required
to provide subsidized higher education for its citizens, 25 it may not con-
dition the enjoyment of such a privilege on the surrender of preferred
constitutional rights, at least in the absence of a compelling state in-
terest.2 6 What must be settled is whether the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of assembly extends to "unruly or unlawful" mass gatherings.
It is fairly easy to maintain that it does not extend to unlawful gather-
ings,27 but it is extremely difficult to say that the guarantee does not
clairvoyant to anticipate that writing such a letter could be punished under either
pertinent regulation. Perhaps a student should be expected to realize that politically
sensitive school administrators might consider any complaint lodged with state
legislators to be inherently "conduct unbefitting."
2"Robards was on disciplinary probation at the time of the incident, a fact
on which the court placed great emphasis. (415 F.2d at 1079, 1088). Although
generally a college may not place unconstitutional conditions on the enjoyment
of state-granted educational privileges, can such conditions be imposed pursuant to
college disciplinary action by analogy to the case of a citizen who can be constitu-
tionally deprived of certain fundamental rights while on probation or parole?
Cooper v. United'States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937) (probationer is not a free
man but is subject to such restrictions as a court may impose); Adamo v. McCorkle,
26 N.J. Super. 562, 98 A.2d 597 (1953) (right to travel may be restricted). Al-
though there appear to be no cases involving this question, two distinctions between
the situations seem to compel a negative response. First, state and federal courts
are constitutionally established and invested with the full authority of the state or
federal government to completely deprive an individual of his liberty in appropri-
ate circumstances, a power which college disciplinary bodies do not possess.
Second, state and federal courts must strictly observe the full range of procedural
rights accorded by the Constitution and can punish only under laws drawn to
satisfy constitutional specifications, limitations that do not all obtain on campus.
22 Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
28 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
2 Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969), for a discussion of first-amendment rights in the educational
context.
" Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 293 U:S. 245 (1934); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961).
2 Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280
F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
"'In a context such as this one, stating that certain conduct is constitutionally
protected means that the interest of the state is not sufficiently compelling to
justify limitation of preferred freedoms, of which assembly is one. The state
has an interest in the preservation of order on the campus, which can in some cases
be of such importance that freedoms may be abridged. But at least one case,
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert; denied, 332 U.S. 851
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extend to "unruly" assemblies. In both Edwards v. South Carolinaps
and Cox v. Louisiana,2 9 the crowds were dancing, clapping and singing
loudly. Although in both situations the deportment of the crowds could
reasonably be described as unruly, the Supreme Court held that the con-
gregations involved were constitutionally protected by the right to freely
assemble.3 0 So, if indeed there is a constitutional right to participate in
an unruly mass gathering, a statute promulgated in the non-academic
world abridging that freedom would be fatally contrary to the demands
of the Constitution. If the first amendment applies with full vigor on
the campus, as the courts maintain,3 1 a similar rule issued by a state
college or university should also be void.
A final notion, perhaps not yet raised to the level of a constitutional
doctrine, related to the rule-making power of a state university is that
the school may discipline a student only for conduct that interferes with
the institution's primary function-namely, "imparting and expanding
the boundaries of knowledge." 32 This concept represents the furtherest
departure to date from the once-popular idea that the school stands in
loco parentis to the student and has despotic power to regulate every
phase of his life.33 The primary-function theory holds, for example, that
while a school may validly punish a student for plagiarism, an offense not
punishable by general society but clearly a danger to the institution's teach-
ing function, it should leave to the civil authorities such serious, but
educationally unrelated, offenses as reckless driving or shoplifting. This
principle has been widely accepted by legal scholars, 4 but it has accrued
(1948), has held that anticipation of violence is not stifficient justification for
preventing assemblies.
28 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
='379 U.S. 536 (1965).See also Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 851 (1948).
"' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
82 Sherry, Governance of the University: Rides, Rights and Responsibilities,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 23, 38 (1966).
"
8North v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill., 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E. 54
(1891); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).8 McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER L.J. 558, 561-63 (1968);
Sherry, Governance of the University: Rights, Rides, and Responsibilities, 54
CALIF. L. REv. 23, 38 (1966); Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the
Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
3 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 1, 28-33 (1965); Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably
Enforced-Gidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN. L. Rnv.
301, 336 (1968).
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only a small following among the courtsY 5 It is interesting to note that the
trial court that decided Esteban accepted this idea."0 Despite its lack
of universal acceptance, the primary-function principles serves as both
an analytical tool and, perhaps, a preview of a soon-to-be-established rule
of law. When the two regulations involved in Esteban are measured
by this principle, the rule governing mass gatherings would be easily
acceptable (assuming that it was not too vague) because colleges and
universities have every right to suppress or prevent riots and disturbances
that might interfere with the orderly pursuit of learning. The "conduct-
befitting" rule, however, can only be tested by resorting to the particular
factual situation so that it can be ascertained whether the school had any




On the first night of disturbances, Robards was present as a spectator
at the scene for thirty minutes; on the second, he was present for one
hour, again as an observer. On both occasions he talked with other stu-
dents in the crowd, and on the second night he discussed with others what
was taking place and expressed his disgust with the college. He also
observed some of the illegal acts of the crowd. 8 As a consequence of these
acts, Robards was cited for "contributing to and participating in an un-
ruly and unlawful mass gathering."' 9
One procedural right on which the courts have uniformly insisted
for students appearing before college disciplinary boards is that they
cannot be punished in the absence of "substantial evidence."4 In light
of this guarantee, how could the Eighth Circuit conclude that there was
substantial evidence of participation by Robards in the crowd's unlawful
acts when it was shown that he did nothing but stand in the crowd and
" Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 472 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
" 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (1968).
" Space limitations prohibit a thorough discussion of all acts charged against
Robards and Esteban, but all acts not analyzed in the text will be mentioned in the
notes.
88 415 F.2d at 1080.
89 Id. at 1082.
' Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968);
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). See
also General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review
of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
[Vol. 48
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converse with his schoolmates? Cases cited by the court itself clearly
establish the principle that a citizen may not be criminally punished for
mere presence in a crowd that committed unlawful acts.41 In Rollins v.
Shannon42 a district court stated unequivocally that "it is clear that mere
presence at an unlawful assembly does not render one liable to arrest
and prosecution .... One must intend to and in fact participate. ' 4' And
in Scoggin v. Lincoln University44 this same principle of "mere presence"
was applied to a case involving a college demonstration. The court
refused to uphold the expulsion of a student by the university because,
while he had been active in organizing the incident and had been present
throughout the violence that resulted, it was not shown that he had
participated in any illegal activity.4 5
Choosing not to rely on decisions directly in point, the Eight Circuit
in Esteban looked to cases from the nonacademic world for a principle
that could be applied to campus activity.4 u The court adopted the
"rational-connection" principle that was first announced in Tot v. United
States47 in 1943 and approved as late as May, 1969, in Leary v. United
States48 to uphold Robards' suspension. This test is stated in United States
v. Romano4" in the following manner: "Such a legislative determina-
tion would not be sustained if there was 'no rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the
one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection...
in common experience.' "50 By adopting this test, the court in Esteban
raised for itself the problem of deciding whether the fact of mere presence
in a crowd is connected in common experience to actual participation in
punishable activity. Does common experience indicate that each individual
in a crowd of several hundred is guilty of every illegal act of the crowd?
The court asserted that Robards "[in] ay not have stopped any automobile,
4' Barr v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 150 (1964) ; Rollins v. Shannon, 292 F. Supp.
580, 590 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
2 292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1968).
-id. at 590.
"291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
I2d.
0While refusing to apply such fundamental principles as "void-for-vagueness"
(see discussion pp. 945-48 supra) and "unconstitutional conditions" (see pp. 948-49
spra), the court unquestioningly applied a severely criticized doctrine of secondary
importance.
41 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
48395 U.S. 6 (1969).
'p382 U.S. 136 (1965).
50Id. at 139.
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or rocked it or forced out its occupants or damaged property, but these
incidents took place and were caused by the mob and he was a part of
the mob."51 Since in deciding whether the requisite "rationality" is
present, subjective factors are probably determinative, it is impossible to
say that the court was wrong. But even if its conclusion was correct,
the result would seem to make every casual bystander guilty of any illegal
act of that amorphous and ill-defined entity, the crowd. The court's
rationale would force an individual contemplating attendance at a gathering
to accurately forecast the presence or absence of violence in order to avoid
punishment.52 Rollins v. Shannon53 and other cases establish the proposi-
tion that this result could not obtain outside the college environment, and
Scoggin v. Lincoln University54 indicates that it should not apply to
activities related to the campus.
Esteban
On the first evening of disturbances, Esteban left his dormitory about
the time that the disruptions were subsiding and proceeded to within a
short distance of the intersection that had been the center of the violence.
There he encountered Dr. Meverden, a faculty member who was seeking
to disperse the remaining students. Meverden twice asked Esteban to
return to his dormitory; twice Esteban refused, insisting that he was
breaking no law and that he "had a right to be out there."55 Esteban
argued with Meverden, questioned his authority, and said that there were
no rules limiting the time men could stay outside the dormitories.
Shortly thereafter, at the encouragement of other students present, Esteban
did return to the dormitory. 6 At the college disciplinary proceeding,
Esteban was charged, inter alia, with "contributing to and participation
in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering . .. in that ... [he] ... did
resist the efforts of one Dr. M. L. Meverden in dispersing said mass
gathering.. .. ""
,415 F.2d at 1085. Judge Lay's dissenting opinion stated categorically that
"there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Robards was a 'participant' in any
unlawful disturbance or illegal demonstration." Id. at 1093.2 Id. at 1080. The dissent in Esteban strongly supported the idea that a student
should not be forced to take this risk. The dissenting judge also seemed to feel
that the chilling effect of this result on the exercise of first-amendment freedoms
was not properly considered by the majority. Id. at 1094-96.
"'292 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mo. 1698).
" 291 F. Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
rr 415 F.2d at 1080.56 Id.
17Id. at 1081.
[Vol. 48
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In considering the events that the Eighth Circuit found sufficient to
warrant Esteban's suspension, it is important to note not only that there
was no proof that Esteban took part in any of the illegal acts committed
by members of the crowd but also that the facts established that he did not
leave his dormitory until "about the time the 'disturbance' had sub-
sided." 8 Yet he too was charged with "contributing to and participating
in an unruly and unlawful mass gathering."59 If it offends due process
to discipline an individual who was merely present in a crowd when
illegal acts were committed, a fortiori punitive action taken against a stu-
dent who did not arrive at the scene until the disruption was almost over is
similarly offensive.
The charge against Esteban was couched in terms seeming to indicate
that it was the order-keeping function of the university upon which he
encroached. But this position is clearly untenable because Esteban did
eventually comply with Meverden's request that he return to his dormi-
tory, thereby satisfying the university's interest in preventing further
violence. Perhaps Esteban was really punished for his tardiness in return-
ing. But Esteban had been in the dormitory until the disturbance had
almost ended, and he may not have known that any illegal acts were com-
mitted. Moreover, it is unclear whether Esteban recognized Meverden as
a member of the faculty or whether Meverden identified himself. It would
seem that if such identity was not established, Esteban could not have
been punished whether he complied promptly, slowly, or not at all with
Meverden's instructions. These two factors would seem to provide
abundant justification for Esteban's less-than-precipitous return to his
dormitory.
A second possible basis for the charge is that Esteban was punished
for failing to comply with a directive of an administrator. The opinion
of the court is full of language supporting the idea that defiance of college
authority is an offense in itself.6 0 Apart from situations on the college cam-
pus, the proposition has been established that an individual may not be pun-
ished for failure to obey an official of the state unless the official's
directive is supported by a valid statute. 1 In Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham,12 the Supreme Court of the United States said, "Our decision makes
8 Id. at 1080.
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1084, 1088 and 1089. The dissent agreed. Id. at 1092.
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965) (opinion dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
02382 U.S. 87 (1965).
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it clear that the mere refusal to move on after a police officer's requesting
that a person standing or loitering should do so is not enough to support
the offense."6 Therefore, it would appear that if Esteban's conduct were
not punishable under a valid statute or university regulation, his defiance
of proper authority could not, by itself, be punished.
One final possibility on which Esteban's suspension may have rested
is that mere disrespect for a member of the faculty or representative of
the administration is an offense in itself. At least one court has accepted
this principle.64 Others have not."5 Perhaps the question that should be
asked is what interest a school has in protecting the personal dignity of
an individual faculty member. In a context such as the one in Esteban,
in which the teaching functions of the school were not at stake, the uni-
versity should have small or no interest, 0 especially since sanctions for
disrespect cannot, standing alone, possibly confer respect.0 7
CONCLUSION
This note has shown that the standard of vagueness applied by the
Eighth Circuit in Esteban to test a state college's regulations is not as
strict as that normally applied to the ordinary criminal statute. It has
also been suggested that the court failed to take proper notice of the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" and that the court found
punishable some acts that would not have been punishable if committed
away from the campus. These results occurred despite the fact that a
generous measure of procedural fairness was given both students.
The relaxing of constitutional standards applicable to substantive
regulations of state universities and colleges may seduce an unwary court
into an almost cavalier attitude toward student rules, a trap that may
have ensnared the Eighth Circuit. After asserting that the pertinent rules
were not vague6" and that vagueness is not a fatal flaw," the court said,
"the college's regulations, per se, do not appear to us to constitute the
"Id. at 91.
,Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 195 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). The
dissent in Esteban subscribed to this position. 415 F.2d at 1092.
" Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 708 (W.D. Wis. 1969) ; Dickey v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
"See text at note 31 supra.
'7 Esteban was also disciplined for refusing to identify himself to Dr. Meverden
and for threatening and using obscene language toward a resident advisor of his
dormitory. 415 F.2d at 1081-82.
"See text at note 13 supra.
"See text at note 14 supra.
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fulcrum of the plaintiff's discomforture. The charges against Esteban and
Robards did not even refer to the regulations."" It is somewhat disturb-
ing to find that an individual can be deprived of a college education on
the basis of vague rules, but it is much more upsetting to discover that
he may be deprived of it on the basis of some previously undefined com-
mon law rule governing the behavior of students. The federal and state
courts have written numerous opinions concerning the procedural rules
to be applied in college disciplinary proceedings; it is clear that they are
concerned that students not be arbitrarily denied the advantages of a public
college education. However, unfairness may not be purged from student
disciplinary action without the strict application of accepted constitutional
standards to the substantive rules. Professor Wright was very close
to the heart of the matter when he said:
If rules of this generality are permissible then students have gained
something, but not very much, from the decisions requiring procedural
safeguards to be observed. It will do a student very little good to be
given every protection of procedural due process ever thought of any-
where if, in the end, he may be expelled because the tribunal is free
to apply a subjective judgment about what is acceptable conduct.
This would be neither fair nor reasonable.7 1
J. CLINTON EUDY
Corporations-Recovery of Indemnity by Passively
Negligent Directors
The exact nature of the legal relationship of corporate directors to the
corporation or its stockholders has long been a source of much confusion.
Various legal theories have been developed:
The position of directors has been variously designated and de-
scribed. Thus, they have been called agents; and they certainly are
for some purposes agents of the corporation. They have also been
called "managing partners ;" but as they are obviously not partners
at all, the phrase is helpful only by analogy. Again, they have been
called "trustees." But a trustee is one who holds the title to property
for the benefit of another, and as directors are not invested with the
title to corporate property, the inaccuracy of the appellation is ap-
parent. The truth is that the status of director and corporation is a
10415 F.2d at 1088.
Wright, The Constitution on Campis, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1065 (1969).
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